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We consider a stage-game where the entrant may simultaneously commit to its product’s quality 
and  the  level  of  its  production  capacity  before  price  competition  takes  place.  We  show  that 
capacity  limitation  is  more  effective  than  quality  reduction  as  a  way  to  induce  entry 
accomodation: the entrant tends to rely exclusively on capacity limitation in a subgame perfect 
equilibrium.  This  is  so  because  capacity  limitation  drastically  changes  the  nature  of  price 
competition  by  introducing  local  strategic  substitutability  whereas  quality  diﬀerentiation  only 
alters the intensity of price competition. 
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assumed by the authors.  1 Introduction
The analysis of entry strategies is a recurring theme within Industrial Organization. Almost all
textbooks devote at least one chapter to this question. The mere fact that industry dynamics
relies on entry is of course sucient to motivate this academic interest. Entry games also
provide a benchmark for the analysis of industries subject to deregulation. Such games also
allow a clearcut analysis of the strategic incentives rms may face in simple stage-games.
It is now common to model oligopoly competition as a two-stage game where a commitment
stage is followed by market competition. More precisely, it is assumed that rms decide rst
on the economic environment and then compete in the resulting market.1 This is typically
the case when one considers the role of technology adoption, competition in research and
development, barriers to entry or product dierentiation. The interactions between these two
stages are well-understood by now and are classically summarized by the \animal" taxonomy
proposed by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). Their basic idea is that the mode of competition
at the market stage, summarized by the distinction between strategic complementarity and
substitutability, is put in relation with the direction of the strategic commitments in terms of
over or under-investment in the corresponding variable. As shown by Fudenberg and Tirole
(1984), this taxonomy is particularly illuminating when one considers the scope for deterrence
or accomodation in entry games.
Notice however that, to the best of our knowledge, this strand of the literature most often
does not allow rms to combine commitment tools. A noticeable exception is the literature
on multi-dimensional product dierentiation where one could argue that each dimension of
product dierentiation is a particular form of commitment. It is striking then to notice that
rms tend to concentrate over a single dimension of dierentiation in equilibrium (see in
particular Irmen and Thisse (1998)).2 Other exceptions such as Rosenkranz (2003) and Lin
and Saggi (2002) explored the links between process and product innovation commitments.
Our contribution enriches previous analysis by letting rms optionally combine drastically
dierent commitment tools before the market competition stage. In particular, we consider a
game where an entrant can commit to a quality and a capacity level before price competition
takes place.
As a matter of fact, many industries feature one or few dominant rms and a fringe of small
competitors. A rationale for this can be found in Gelman and Salop (1983) who claim that in
order to relax price competition and make entry protable, an entrant can use a \stick{and{
carrot" strategy. She voluntarily limits her production capacity to guarantee a large residual
1Obviously, one could consider more stages, but the two-stages synthesis has gained wide acceptance.
2Obviously, many other contributions allow for a dichotomous choice between various commitment strate-
gies, see for example Belleamme (2001) and establish the conditions under which one tool dominates the
other. However these tools cannot be combined.
2demand for the incumbent but she names a low price that would prove dear to undercut. In
their discussion of possible means to achieve this credible commitment, the authors claim that
\producing a product with limited consumer appeal is analogous to capacity limitation" i.e.,
they identify capacity limitation with inferior quality dierentiation. It is indeed true that a
similar strategic commitment is at work in the models of quality dierentiation of Gabszewicz
and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982) where the entrant optimally chooses a low
quality and oers a substantial rebate on her product in order to induce the incumbent not to
ght too aggressively in prices. The incumbent therefore prefers to accomodate entry although
it is always possible for him to exclude the entrant from the market.
Our starting point then is to combine these two approaches by allowing the entrant to
pick both a product quality and a production capacity. The question we raise is the following:
does the entrant use product dierentiation and capacity precommitment simultaneously? In
other words, are capacity and quality choice substitutes or complements in softening price
competition?
Our rst result provides a negative answer to the above question. We show indeed in
Proposition 1 that under ecient rationing, the entrant will typically choose quality imitation
coupled with an optimal capacity limitation in a subgame perfect equilibrium. Although
we cannot rule out the existence of subgame perfect equilibria where some dierentiation
prevails, we show that the entrant's payo is bounded from above by the payos prevailing in
the no-dierentiation equilibrium. Capacity commitment thereofre seems to dominate quality
dierentiation. This result is established in a very specic model and may not be robust to
perturbations. However, while establishing this result, we also shed a new light on two crucial
components of the analysis of oligopoly competition.
First, we oer original developments for the analysis of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition
games under product dierentiation. Even though real life industries are most often character-
ized by rms selling dierentiated products and facing various forms of quantitative constraints
(at least in the short-run), the class of corresponding pricing games is probably the most un-
derstudied theoretical problem in Industrial Organization. While the case of homogeneous
product has received much attention, in particular after Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), the
case of dierentiated products has been almost completely ignored. From a theoretical point
of view, this is unfortunate: the robustness of virtually all oligopoly pricing models in which
rms sell dierentiated products is actually limited to those cases where marginal cost is con-
stant. The analysis of Bertrand-Edgeworth games with product dierentiation calls for a very
specic analysis, some premices of which are laid out in this paper.
Lastly, our analysis sheds light on the analysis of commitment strategies. In particular we
argue in the last section of the paper that the two instruments we consider, capacity limitation
and product dierentiation, display qualitatively dierent implications for the ensuing pricing
game. These dierences may provide a useful basis for a taxonomy of commitment strategies
3which is complementary to Fudenberg and Tirole (1984)'s \animal" one.
Preliminaries are developed in the next section. Section 3 is devoted to the equilibrium
analysis while the last section discusses the implications of our analysis.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The model
We follow Mussa and Rosen (1978) and (Tirole, 1988, sec. 2.1) to model quality dierentiation.
A consumer with personal characteristic x is willing to pay xs for one unit of quality s and
nothing more for additional units. He maximizes surplus and when indierent between two
products, select his purchase randomly. Types are uniformly distributed in [0;1] and the mass
of consumers is normalized to 1.
In agreement with most observed real cases, the incumbent is committed to the best
available quality (normalized to unity) before entrants get an opportunity to pick their own,
without however the ability to leapfrog him. We also assume that quality is not costly for
rms3 and that the marginal cost of production is nil (up to the capacity limit and equal to
+1 otherwise). These considerations lead us to study the following stage game4 G:
 At t = 0; an incumbent i enters the market and selects the top quality si = 1 and a
large capacity ki = 1.
 At t = 1; an entrant e selects its quality se = s  1 and capacity ke = k  1.
 At t = 2; rms compete simultaneously in prices.
We denote G(s;k) the pricing game occurring at the last stage. Our solution concept for
the game G is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. Observe that two classes of price subgames
might be generated by choices made at t = 1: either k = 1 and we face a standard game of
vertical dierentiation or k < 1 and we face a Bertrand-Edgeworth game with (possibly)
product dierentiation.
Consumers make their choice at the last stage by comparing the respective surpluses they
derive when buying from the incumbent, the entrant or nobody i.e., x   pi, xs   pe and 0. In
the absence of dierentiation (s = 1), demands are as in the standard Bertrand game. In the
presence of dierentiation (s < 1), it is a straightforward exercice to show that demands are
3 An upper bound on the admissible qualities is required to ensure that rms' payos are bounded.
4Recall that Gelman and Salop (1983)'s model is of the Stackelberg type where the entrant commits to
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Firms' prots in the pricing game are
e(pi;pe) = peDe(pi;pe) and i(pi;pe) = piDi(pi;pe) (3)
When capacity is not an issue (k = 1) and products are dierentiated (s < 1), Choi and
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Figure 1: The price space with unlimited capacity












Plugging (6) into (3), we obtain the entrant's rst stage payo as a function of his quality:
e =
s(1 s)
(4 s)2. Straightforward computations yield the following corollary.
Corollary 1 The optimal quality for the entrant in the class of pricing games
fG(s;1);s < 1g is s = 4
7, yielding the prot 
e = 1
48.
Notice that the pricing game G(1;1) is a classical Bertrand game with linear demand
D(p) = 1   p. In case of a price tie, demand is shared equally by the two rms.
2.2 Sales Functions in the presence of rationing
Whenever the entrant has unlimited capacity (k = 1), sales are equal to demand as charac-
terized by equations (1) and (2). However, if the entrant has built a limited capacity (k < 1),
there are prices leading up to more demand than can be served i.e., De(pe;pi) > k. In such
cases, some consumers will be rationed and possibly report their purchase on the incumbent.
In order to characterize rms' sales in that situation, we assume ecient rationing: rationed
consumers are those exhibiting the lowest willingness to pay for the good. The limited k units
sold by the entrant will be contested by potential buyers,5 the price pe paid for them will rise








> k , pe < e  (pi   k(1   s))s (7)
while in the case of monopoly,
De(pe;pi) = 1  
pe
s
> k , pe < s(1   k) (8)
Using (7) and (8), the entrant is capacity constrained i.e., Se(pe;pi) = k whenever
pe  minfe;s(1   k)g (9)
Now, using (1), we obtain the residual demand addressed to the incumbent rm as
D
r
i(pi)  1   ks   pi: (10)
5We implicitely assume that a secondary market opens where consumers may take advantage of the arbitrage
possibilities at no cost.
6The expressions for the sales functions are therefore:
Se(pi;pe) =
8
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where branch (11:c) is void if pi < 1   ks.
3 Equilibrium analysis
The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we characterize rms' best responses in subgames
G(s;k). A key result of this subsection consists in showing that the presence of a capacity
constraint leads to a discontinuity in the incumbent's best reponses. Second, we characterize
rms' payos in the price equilibria of G(s;k). The key result here is the following: although
we do not explicitely characterize equilibrium strategies, we establish an upper bound for the
entrant's payo over the whole set of price subgames G(s;k). This enables us to characterize
the set of subgame perfect equilibria of G in the third section.
3.1 Price best responses
Whenever k < 1, the analysis of G(k;s) must take into account the possibility that rms sales
are respectively given by equations (12:b) and (11:d) where the entrant's capacity is binding
and the incumbent recovers all rationed consumers. It is immediate to see that the best the
entrant can do is to sell her capacity at the highest price, which is e. On the other hand,
whenever the incumbent plays along segment (12:b), he maximizes prots by trying to set
 pi  1 ks
2 , and, if successful, obtains a minmax prot equal to i 
(1 ks)2
4 .
Given the incumbent's price pi, the entrant's payo function remains concave in own prices
(over the domain where De(:)  0). The best response function is now given by
BRe(pi;k) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
pis
2 if pi  2k(1   s)































Figure 2: The price space with binding capacity
On Figure 2 we illustrate the case k > 1
2 (in the other case, the third branch of (13)
vanishes).
As should appear from the inspection of Si(pe), the payo of the incumbent is likely to
be non-concave when his sales switch from segment (12:b) to (12:c). Accordingly, the best


















over the whole domain where
i(pe) =
pe+1 s































Depending on the value of the capacity k, we might therefore obtain two dierent shapes
for the best response of the incumbent rm in the pricing game:
8 if k  h(s), then
BRi(pe) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
1 ks
2 if pe  ^ pe
pe+1 s
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2 if pe  ~ pe
pe
s if ~ pe < pe  s
2
1
2 if pe  s
2
(18)
The critical values ^ pe and ~ pe therefore identify the price level at which rm i is indierent
between naming the security price  pi = 1 ks
2 or naming a lower price which ensures a larger
market share. The resulting discontinuity is likely to destroy the existence of a pure strategy
equilibrium.6
A critical comment is in order at this step. Comparative statics analysis on the best
responses functions indicate that changes in s, i.e. in the degree of product dierentiation
essentially aect the shape of best replies, it aects in particular the slope of the entrant's
one and the position of the incumbent's. However, as long as installed capacities cannot be
binding, the pricing game retains strategic complementarity as its main dening characteristic.
By contrast, whenever the entrant decides to limit its capacity, the nature of the strategic
interaction is altered. The incumbent's best repsonses exhibits a discontinuity, but even more
importantly, for some critical level of price ^ pe, the best response jumps down, i.e. at this
cut-o price, the game locally exhibits strategic substitutability. When choosing the level
of installed capacity, the entrant is actually choosing the highest price level for which the
incumbent is willing to really accommodate entry, in the sense of "being soft" in the pricing
game. Unsurprisingly, the qualitative dierence between the product dierentiation device
and the capacity one, as exemplied by their eect on price best responses will play a crucial
role in determining subgame perfect equilibrium strategies.
3.2 Price Equilibrium
We analyze the Nash equilibria for each price subgame G(s;k). Let us rst deal with imitation
whereby the entrant chooses top quality (s = 1). In this case, the vertical dierentiation
model degenerates into a Bertrand-Edgeworth competition for a homogenous product. Levitan
6 In order to avoid any misunderstanding, let us stress that it is only the existence of a pure strategy
equilibrium which is problematic here. Since payos are continuous as long as products are dierentiated, the
existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium is ensured by Glicksberg (1952)'s theorem (Dasgupta and Maskin
(1986) is not needed).
9and Shubik (1972) analyze this game under the ecient rationing hypothesis and derive the
following result whose proof is given in Appendix A.7 Notice that applying Gelman and Salop
(1983)'s Stackelberg sequentiality to the current demand yields exactly the same optimal
capacity (cf. Appendix B).
Lemma 2 G(1;k) has a unique price equilibrium in which the entrant earns exactly k~ pe(1;k).
Furthermore the maximum of this payo is y
e  3
4   1 p
2 ' 0:043 and is reached for ky 
1   1 p
2 ' 0:293.
When products are dierentiated and one rm faces a capacity constraint, the existence of
a price equilibrium is not problematic since payos are continuous (cf. Footnote 6). Besides,
there exists quality-capacity constellations where a pure strategy equilibrium exists. More
precisely, the pure strategy equilibrium prevailing in the limiting case where k = 1 is preserved.











4 s is a pure strategy equilibrium of G(s;k)
whenever k  g(s).
Proof The candidate equilibrium is (p
i;p
i) characterized in Lemma 1 (cf. eq. (6) and
Figure 1). The price p
i remains a best response to p
e only if p
e  ^ pe; straightforward compu-
tations yield the condition k  g(s) and since g(s) > h(s), we check that ^ pe was indeed the
benchmark to use. 
Whenever k < g(s), a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist. For intermediate capacities,
it is easy to identify a particular equilibrium in which the incumbent randomizes over two
atoms while the entrant plays the pure strategy ^ pe. However, there also exists a domain of
small capacities where even this equilibrium fails to exist. When this is the case, both rms use
non-degenerate mixed strategy in equilibrium. The equilibrium strategy used by rm j = i;e
in equilibrium of G(k;s) is denoted Fj; the lower bound and upper bound of the support of Fj




j .9 With these notations in hand, we now establish a set
of lemmata which allow us to identify an upper bound for the entrant's equilibrium payos in
pricing subgames.










7Since h(1) = 1, the relevant benchmark is ~ pe.
8Indeed, g(s) > h(s) , 16s2 (1   s) + s4 (3 + s) > 0 which is always true (over the relevant domain
0  s  1).
9 W.l.o.g. pure (price) strategies belong to the compact [0;v]. A mixed strategy is F 2 , the space
of (Borel) probability measures over [0;1], its support  (F) is the set of all points for which every open
neighbourhood has positive measure. We then have p = inf( (F)) and p = sup( (F)).




2, the monopoly price because at any pi > 1
2, i(pi;pe) is decreasing in pi,
thus the average i(pi;Fe) is also decreasing in pi which proves that such a price cannot belong




2) is the largest best
reply for the entrant to consider. This means that for pe > BRe(1
2), e(pi;pe) is decreasing
in pe whatever pi  1




Referring to Figure 2, one observes that because BRi(pe) for pe > ^ pe and BRe(pi) are both
increasing, they cannot cross. Reiterating the previous reasoning, we can sequentially reduce
the upper price played by each rm in a Nash equilibrium. This tendency to lower prices
comes to a stop at  pi = 1 ks
2 because there is no reason to exclude the incumbent from putting










Lemma 5 Let k < g(s). In equilibrium of G(k;s), p
+
i = 1 ks
2 and the equilibrium payo is
the minimax i.
Proof We may check by algebra that when k < g(s), it is true that 2k(1   s) <  pi = 1 ks
2 .
This implies that BRe( pi) = e and by the previous lemma, that p+
e  e. Hence, for pi
in a neighborhood of  pi, the incumbent's sales are the residual ones Dr
i so that we have
i(pi;Fe) = pi(1   ks   pi).
If 2k(1 s)  p
+









i cannot be part of an equilibrium strategy for the incumbent.
If, on the contrary, p
+
i < 2k(1 s), then the previous argument does not apply because the
incumbent's sales might vary. However, if this case occurs then the entrant's demand, when
facing Fi, is always of the duopolistic kind without capacity constraint, hence his best reply is
the pure strategy e computed at the average of pi. Since the pure strategy equilibrium does
not exist over the present domain, the incumbent must be playing a mixed strategy and the
only candidate when the entrant plays a pure strategy involves playing the security price  pi,
a contradiction with p
+
i <  pi.
We have thus shown that p
+
i = 1 ks
2 and since the equilibrium payo can be computed at
any price in the support of Fi, we have i(p
+
i ;Fe) = p
+




4 = i. 
Lemma 6 Let k < g(s). In equilibrium of G(k;s), p 
e  ^ pe if k  h(s) and p 
e  ~ pe if
k  h(s). The entrant's equilibrium payo is bounded from above by k^ pe(s;k) if k  h(s) and
by k~ pe(s;k) if k  h(s).
Proof: Let us consider rst the case k < h(s). If p 
e > ~ pe then for any pi <
p 
e
s , the incum-
bent's demand is monopolistic whatever pe  p 
e . Hence, i(pi;Fe) = pi(1   pi) is strictly in-
creasing, which means the lowest price of the mixed strategy Fi cannot belong to this area. We
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i ;Fe) = p
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by denition of ~ pe and by the previous lemma. This inequality is a contradiction with p
 
i





s . Then, i(p
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i is an optimal price and
p 
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previous argument applies and we obtain again a contradiction. This proves p 
e > ~ pe is not
true i.e., our claim.
The second claim is a simple consequence of the fact that the equilibrium payo can be
computed at any price in the support of Fe, hence
e(p
 






e ;pi)dFi(pi)  kp
 
e  k~ pe
since sales are bounded by the capacity. The case for k  h(s) is identical since the benchmarks
~ pe and ^ pe play a symmetric role. 
3.3 Optimal Selection of Capacity and Quality
Although we do not have a full characterization of the mixed strategy equilibrium in all
possible subgames, we have derived enough to state:
Proposition 1 An optimal quality-capacity pair is s = 1 and k = ky. Other optimal pairs
necessarily satisfy s   s  2(
p
2   1) ' 0:83 and sk = ky.







which is a function of
the product x = ks; whose maximum is reached for x = ky and yields an overall maximum
y
e: It then remains to observe that this is precisely the optimal quality and the maximum
entrant's payo for s = 1 and k = ky as shown in Lemma 2. The pair
 
1;ky
is shown as a
diamond on Figure 3. The maximum payo over the domain s < 1 and k < h(s) is therefore
dominated by that in G(1;ky).
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4s . The maximum is achieved at  s
(previously dened) and leads to the optimal capacity ky= s ' 0:35 and prot y




satises k = h(s) and is shown as a dot on Figure 3. We have thus shown that the
entrant's prot for h(s)  k  g(s) is lower than a function whose maximum is y
e.




48 ' 0:021 < y
e ' 0:043. Overall, the pair
 
1;ky
is an optimal strategy; there










Figure 3: Strategy Space
4 Comments
Proposition 1 has been obtained in a highly stylized model. Notice however that it is also built
on a set of new theoretical results pertaining to the analysis of Bertrand-Edgeworth models
with product dierentiation. Obviously, the ecient rationing rule and the fact that quality
is not costly are instrumental in obtaining such clearcut results. It is our belief however, that
our analysis actually illustrates a more general moral.
The rst lesson is merely a reminder, though an important one. Oligopoly pricing games
with product dierentiation are almost always analyzed under the assumption of constant re-
turns to scale. Pure strategy equilibria are then the rule. This assumption is quite restrictive:
casual observation suggest that most of the time, rms install limited production capacities
(and most often produce in the vicinity of these capacity limits), and sell dierentiated prod-
ucts. The nature of equilibria in pricing games with dierentiated products and (various forms
of) decreasing returns to scale should be investigated further. Our present analysis suggests
indeed that the presence of capacity constraints carries dramatic implications in models where
product dierentiation is endogenous. Wihtin the limited scope of our model, the supposedly
ubiquitous \principle of maximum dierentiation" does not hold! A more general analysis of
Bertrand-Edgeworth games with dierentiated products is denitely called for.
A second lesson pertains to the analysis of commitment strategies. It may indeed seem
a priori that capacity limitation and quality dierentiation are two faces of the same coin;
in both cases indeed, the entrant chooses a low prole aimed at making upfront competition
costly for the incumbent. As a result, the incumbent optimally chooses to accommodate entry.
Our analysis reveals however that these strategies have qualitatively dierent implications for
the market competition stage. In the original pricing game, prices are strategic complements.
This property is fully preserved when a product dierentiation strategy is retained. Product
13dierentation smoothes price competition by introducing continuity in demand and by enlarg-
ing the set of prices where the market is shared by the two rms. Capacity limitation works
dierently by introducing two dierent strategic proles into the pricing game. In our model,
because of the entrant's limited capacity, the incumbent can choose to price high and some-
how retreat on a protected market or to price aggressively and cover the whole market. Even
though prices remain strategic complements in each of these two proles, prices are locally
strategic substitutes at the critical level of the entrant's prices where the incumbent switches
from one regime to the other. In other words, capacity constraints introduce a qualitative
change in the nature of strategic interaction at the market stage. To some extent, it partially
changes the mode of market competition and this is instrumental in explaining why rms tend
to rely exclusively on capacity limitation in order to relax price competition. In particular,
under vertical dierentiation, opting for a low quality level automatically implies that the po-
tential surplus to be extracted from consumers decreases. This is costly for the entrant. The
capacity limitation strategy does not have this drawback while carriyng with it the benets
of a relaxed competition.
The, now classical, animal taxonomy of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) relies on a relationship
between the nature of strategic interaction at the market stage and the direction of strategic
commitments made at earlier stages. Our analysis suggests that a complementary classication
of commitments could be considered. One might indeed distinguish those tools which alter
the intensity of the strategic interaction from those which change its nature. In our example,
quality dierentiation belongs to the rst class whereas capacity limitiation belongs to the
second. Other examples are easy to identify. Lock-in models for instance also have this
property of separating the markets into dierent segments for later stages, thereby allowing
for strategic complementarity within segments but strategic substitutability between segments.
We plan to explore this line of reasoning further in future research.
Appendix
A: Proof of Lemma 2
Let Fe and Fi be the equilibrium cumulative distributions, assuming no mass except at the
end points. Due to the nature of demand, the entrant gets all demand if her price p is the
lowest i.e., with probability 1   Fi(p), her payo is thus e = p(1   Fi(p))minfk;1   pg:
Likewise the incumbent's is i = p(1   p   Fe(p)minfk;1   pg). Bottom prices have to be
the same because otherwise one prot would be strictly increasing in between (all prices are
lesser than the monopoly one) and this would contradict the equilibrium denition.
At the common bottom price pl, Fi = 0 and 1   pl > k; thus e = kpl: The entrant's top
price cannot be greater than the incumbent's one because e would be zero, hence at the top
price ph, Fe = 1. If there was no rationing at ph then i would be zero, thus 1   ph > k and
14i = ph (1   ph   k). Furthermore the right derivative must be negative to make sure than
no other greater price is better, hence ph  1 k
2 : We also have Fe(p) =
1 p i=p
k (recall that
1   p > k over the whole interval) thus the density must be fe(p) = 1
k (i=p2   1). Being
positive, we derive p2  i = ph (1   ph   k) and applying this inequality at the top price, we
get ph  1 k
2 . Combining with the reverse inequality, we obtain ph = 1 k
2 , so that i =
(1 k)2
4 .







which is ~ pe(1;k) so
that e = k~ pe(1;k) as claimed. 
B: Optimal Capacity in Judo Economics
In Gelman and Salop (1983)'s setting, the challenger enters with capacity k and commited
price pe to which the incumbent later responds with pi. The incumbent's payo with the
aggressive price-cutting strategy is (1   pe)pe. By accommodating and serving the residual





Playing on the possibility of inducing accommodation, the entrant can maximize her prot
kpe under the constraints p
i > pe (undercut the incumbent) and (1 pe)pe 
(1 k)2
4 (leave the















Since the entrant's prot is increasing with capacity, he will choose a value that saturates the
constraint i.e., k = 1 2
p











2 ' 0:15, leading to k = 1   1 p
2 = ky. 
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